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Introduction
Patent law and the Federal drug approval laws are both rather arcane and complex. The intersection of
these two areas in the Hatch-Waxman Act is particularly complicated, and this perhaps explains the failure
of the Act to consistently comply with core philosophical principles for supporting the modern intellectual
property regime. The following paper addresses the problems arising from the thirty-month stay provision of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, evaluates the legitimacy of the provision under accepted philosophical justications
for intellectual property, and suggests possible alternatives for addressing the failures of this provision.
The Certication Procedure
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, otherwise known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act, has been quite successful in increasing the availability of generic drugs to consumers. By
1996, forty-three percent of the prescription drugs sold in the United States were generic compared to just
nineteen percent in 1984.2Despite the Act's overall success in promoting increased availability of generic
drugs, the Act's provisions relating to patent certication actually delay approval of generic drugs.
When a party les a new drug application (\NDA") the Food and Drug Administration (\FDA") requires
submission of certain patents. According to C.F.R. x 314.53:
1B.S. Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University (1998); J.D. Harvard Law School (2001). Brian Range wrote this paper
to fulll the third-year written work requirement for Harvard Law School.
2See How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Aected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry
(visited Mar. 6, 2001) <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=0&from=5>.
1An applicant... shall submit information on each patent that claims the drug or method of using
the drug that is the subject of the new drug application or amendment or supplement to it and
with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not
licensed by the owner of the patent engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug product.
For purposes this part, such patents consist of drug substance (ingredient) patents, drug product
(formulation and composition) patents, and method of use patents. Process patents are not covered
by this section.
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the \Orange Book,"
is compiled by the FDA and lists all approved drugs along with ocial and proprietary names of the drug.3
When patent information is submitted for a new drug application in accordance with C.F.R. x 314.53, the
patent information is included in the Orange Book.4
Through the abbreviated new drug application (\ANDA") process, a party may obtain FDA approval of
generic drugs without clinical trials if the drug is a bioequivalent of a drug previously granted NDA approval.
ANDA approval requires that an applicant make a patent certication \with respect to each patent issued
by the United States Patent and Trademark Oce that, in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of
its knowledge, claims the reference listed drug or claims a use of such listed drug for which the applicant is
seeking approval...."5 Certication requires the ANDA applicant to state that: (1) the NDA holder submit-
ted no patent to the FDA; (2) any patent submitted has expired; (3) the date the applicable patent expires;
or (4) that \the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of
the drug product for which the abbreviated application is submitted."6
If an ANDA applicant certies a patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed (a \paragraph IV certi-
cation"), the applicant must notify the NDA holder of the certication.7 After being notied of paragraph
3See Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, (visited Mar. 6, 2001)
<http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/preface/ecpreface.htm>. See also 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(7)(A)(i).
4See 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(7)(A)(iii).
521 C.F.R. x 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A).
621 C.F.R. x 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A); see also 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(2)(A)(I)-(IV).
7See 21 C.F.R. x 314.95.
2IV certication, a NDA holder may sue the ANDA applicant for patent infringement by utilizing 35 U.S.C.
x 271(e)(2)(A).
Normally, patent infringement only occurs when an infringer makes, uses, oers for sale, sells, or imports an
invention into the United States.8 35 U.S.C.(e)(2)(A) however makes submission of ANDA application on
a patented drug an act of an infringement which can not be the basis of damage claims but can result in
injunctive relief which prevents approval, sale, or use of the generic drug until after the NDA holder's patent
expires.9
If the NDA holder les suit within forty-ve days of paragraph IV certication, the thirty-month stay
provision is triggered so that the ANDA application will not be approved for thirty months.10 The delay is
statutory and automatic. The NDA holder does not need to show any likelihood of success on the merits.
The statute provides limited opportunities for the ANDA applicant to gain approval before thirty-months
passes. First, the court can extend or reduce the thirty-month delay if either party fails \to cooperate in
reasonably expediting the action [the patent litigation]."11 A court reduction in the thirty-month stay period
is probably unlikely barring serious abuse of the litigation process, for example discovery stall tactics.
Second, the thirty-month period will expire if a court issues a nal order determining that the patent is
invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.12 Presumably, a \nal order" includes a summary judgment or trial
verdict on the merits. Unfortunately for ANDA applicants, summary judgment or a trial verdict on these
8See 35 U.S.C. 154; 35 U.S.C. 271(a).
9See 35 U.S.C.(e)(4).
10See 21 C.F.R. x 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A).
1121 C.F.R. x 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A).
1221 C.F.R. x 314.107(b)(3)(i)(B)(ii).
3issues is unlikely until after a Markman hearing has occurred in order to determine the scope of the NDA
holder's patent.13 A Markman hearing typically requires full-blown discovery, use of experts, and other
extensive trial preparations.14
Even after a Markman hearing, summary judgment may not be available. In this case, the stay period will
not expire until after a complete and lengthy jury trial on the merits of patent validity and infringement.
Therefore, as long as a NDA holder is unwilling to settle, the ANDA holder cannot expect that their ANDA
application will be approved quickly.
Comparing the ANDA Stay Provision with Preliminary Injunction Practice
The scope of exclusivity granted by the FDA's thirty month stay provision under 21 C.F.R. x 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A)
has the same eect as a preliminary injunction because the provision prevents the ANDA applicant from
producing, selling, or using its applied for drug product until a trial decision is made in the ANDA applicant's
favor. Because of the statute has a similar result to a preliminary injunction, it is useful to compare the
dierences in how these to results are obtained.
A patent holder seeking a preliminary injunction against an alleged infringer must demonstrate \(1) a rea-
sonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) a balance
of hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the injunction's favorable impact on the public interest."15 The
factors taken individually are not dispositive; instead, a district court in its discretion \must weigh and
measure each factor against the other factors and against the form and magnitude of the relief requested.16
Showing the rst two factors, likelihood of success and irreparable harm, are essential if a preliminary in-
13See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 1384 (1996) (holding that the judge must determine the scope of
patent claims as a matter of law).
14See Claim Interpretation in a Post Markman Environment, 572 PLI/Pat 681, 692 (1999) (discussing various possibilities
regarding time and scope of Markman hearings and noting that Markman hearings are most often held immediately before the
close of discovery).
15Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 2001 WL 123818 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Reebok Int'l Ltd. V. J. Baker, Inc.,
32 F.3d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
16Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4junction is to be granted.17 The preliminary injunction should not issue if the alleged infringer raises an
infringement or invalidity defense that the plainti cannot prove \lacks substantial merit."18 For exam-
ple, if the defense puts forth evidence of invalidity insucient to prove invalidity on summary judgment
yet \presents a serious challenge to validity" to be assessed at trial, the preliminary injunction will not be
granted.19
In contrast to the requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction, the FDA's thirty-month stay pro-
vision under 21 C.F.R. x 314.107 takes eect regardless of likelihood of success or irreparable harm. If a
NDA holder les suit, the ANDA applicant's entry into the market is delayed for thirty months or until the
ANDA applicant receives a favorable verdict even where the NDA holder has a very small chance of success
on the merits of the suit. The ANDA applicant's barrier to entry remains absolute even where the ANDA
holder presents powerful defenses that either tend to show non-infringement or presents serious challenges
to validity of the NDA holder's patents. Further, the stay provision is eective even though the only harm
of ANDA approval to the NDA holder may be monetary so that no threat of irreparable harm exists.
NDA holders gain a scope of protection on their patents allowing immediate injunctions against competition
even if the patents are likely to be found invalid or to narrow to cover the ANDA applicant's product. No
other patent holders enjoy this broadened scope of preliminary protection. Instead, other patent holders
must seek preliminary injunctions that are available only when the relevant patent is likely to be found valid
and where infringement is likely. Without being able to make these showings, the patent holder can only
seek damages after the fact of infringement and cannot prevent the competitor from making, using, or selling
the patented product during the lengthy trial process.
17See Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 2001 WL 123818 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
18Genetech, Inc. v. Novo Nordsik, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
19See Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 2001 WL 123818 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Helix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd.,
208 F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
5Tactical Use of the Thirty-Month Stay Provision
Because the thirty-month stay provision takes eect automatically, NDA holders have a very signicant
incentive to le suit against ANDA applicants even where the merits of the case are weak. Additionally,
the power of the thirty-month stay provision provides incentive for NDA holders to list as many patents
as possible in the Orange Book in order to ensure that competitors will need to make a paragraph IV
certication even after a primary patent covering the NDA product has expired. The practice of prosecuting
and listing secondary patents is referred to as \evergreening" or \trip wire" listing of patents.20
In recent years, NDA holders have often brought suit against an ANDA applicant where the cases have had
little merit, yet initiating the litigation nonetheless triggers the thirty-month stay period and delays ANDA
approval. For example, a NDA holder may engage in a strained legal argument for extending the life of a
patent in order to sustain a lawsuit for a period of time.
In 1995, Geneva and Noropharm led ANDA applications to produce generic terazosin hydrochloride.21
Abbott Laboratories sued each of these applicants on the basis of a patent that rather clearly expired on
October 15, 1994.22 Abbott used a strained legal argument (asserting that the twenty-year patent term
should start from the ling date of the divisional application rather than the original parent application) to
claim that the patent really would not expire until January 21, 1997 in order to list the patent's expiration
in the Orange Book as that date and in order to bring suit against the ANDA applicants thus triggering the
ANDA stay provision.23
20Terry G. Mahn, The Hatch-Waxman Act During Patent Prosecution and Beyond, Food and Drug Law J. (1999).
21See Abbott Laboratories v. Novopharm Ltd., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1309 (N.D.Ill. 1996).
22See id.
23See id.
6The district court dismissed Abbott's case pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) on March 16, 1996, and the Federal
Circuit armed this dismissal in a succinct January 14, 1997 opinion.24 Here, the ANDA applicants had a
clear cut case (clear enough to win the case on a motion to dismiss), but the barest legal argument as to
why Abbott's patent should have expired in January 21, 1997 allowed Abbott to trigger the thirty-month
stay provision and perpetuate the monopoly on its NDA product for over a year past the expiration date
of their patent. The problem is exacerbated by the FDA's apparent lack of review or understanding of the
patent laws in that it blindly accepted for the Orange Book Abbott's assertion that its patent would expire
in 1997 and used this assertion to deny ANDA approval to two competitors.
In addition to triggering the ANDA stay provision by arguing for extended patent terms, NDA holders trig-
ger the stay provisions by suing based on unsustainably broad readings of their patents. Elan Corporation
submitted an ANDA for a high blood pressure medication on April 30, 1997.25 The SSA (surface area per
weight) of Elan's product was 6.15 m2/g while Bayer intentionally changed its patent during the course of
prosecution so that it covered ranges from 1.0 to 4 m2/g instead of 1.0 to 6 m2/g.26 Nonetheless, Bayer
brought suit triggering the thirty-month stay provision.
The Federal Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor Elan and found that Bayer's patent could not possi-
bly cover Elan's product literally or under the doctrine of equivalents because Bayer had \made statements
of clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter outside the claimed SSA range of 1.0 to 4 m2/g."27
Despite the fact that Bayer's patent clearly did not cover Elan's product, Bayer's strained argument for a
broad scope of its claims triggered the thirty-month stay provision and delayed Elan's ANDA application at
least until March 16, 1999 when the district court granted summary judgment in Elan's favor.28 Bayer thus
extended the monopoly on its NDA product for nearly two years by keeping a product not covered by its
24See Abbot Laboratories v. Novopharm Ltd., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
25See Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
26See id. at 1247.
27Id. at 1253.
28See Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp., 64 F. Supp.2d 1295 (N.D. Geo. 1999).
7patents out of the marketplace.
Many other lawsuits have been led triggering the ANDA thirty-month stay provision based on an argument
for an unsustainably broad reading of patent claims. The litigation over a secondary Marrion Merrell Dow
patent covering Seldane (the primary Seldane patent expired before Norton led an ANDA application)
lasted thirty months before Baker Norton was granted summary judgment on the issues of literal infringe-
ment and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.29 Thus, Marrion used a \trip wire" patent to gain
the entire benet of the thirty-month stay provision even though the case for infringement was not even
strong enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
The possible scenarios and tactical litigation moves that can arise are further complicated by the fact that
the rst ANDA applicant to make a paragraph IV certication is granted 180 days of exclusive production
before a second ANDA applicant can gain approval for its application.30 Mova Pharmaceuticals v. Shalala
illustrates the kind of situation that may arise.31 Mova led an ANDA application to produce a generic
diabetes drug in December 1994.32 The NDA holder, Upjohn, led suit to trigger the thirty-month stay
provision.33 Eight months later, a third company, Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. led its own ANDA, and
Upjohn did not challenge the certication by Mova within forty-ve days so the thirty-month stay provision
was not triggered.34
The FDA granted the one hundred eighty day exclusivity period to Mylan instead of Mova since Mylan
had not yet \successfully defended" itself against Upjohn.35 Mova challenged this decision and ultimately
prevailed in April 1998 when the D.C. Circuit held that the FDA's successful defense requirement was un-
sustainable based on Congress's statutory language.36
29See Marrion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 1050, 1057 (S.D.Fla. 1996).
30See 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
31140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
32See DC Cir. Rules FDA Regulation on Exclusivity is Invalid, 5 Andrews Intell. Prop. Litig. Rep. 5 (May 13, 1998).
33See id.
34See id.
35See id.
36See 140 F.3d 1060, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
8The complicated statutory construction issues surrounding the 180-day exclusivity period addressed by the
D.C. Circuit obscures the overall picture of what happened in this case. Upjohn sued Mylan in February
1997, and the trial court ruled that Upjohn's patent was invalid and not infringed on March 31, 1998.37 At
least two generic drug manufacturers wanted to compete with Upjohn, but one competitor ANDA approval
was delayed from December 1994 to June 1997 because the thirty-month stay period was triggered on the
basis of a patent that was ultimately found to be invalid and entitled to no legal weight whatsoever. Upjohn,
in deciding whether or not to use an invalid patent to sue a particular ANDA applicant making a paragraph
IV certication within fteen days of notication, wielded the incredible power of determining who, if any-
one, it would compete with.
The problematic interaction between the thirty-month stay provision and 180-day exclusivity period is il-
lustrated by a footnote in the Mova case.38 An amicus brief by Biovail Corporation reveals that it was the
second applicant to le a paragraph IV certication for a heart medication.39 The rst ANDA applicant
was sued the NDA holder for patent infringement, and Biovail claimed that the NDA holder was paying the
ANDA holder $10 million per quarter in exchange for the rst applicant agreeing not to sell its product after
the 30-month stay provision expires.40 Thus, both the rst applicant and NDA holder had incentive to drag
out the patent litigation in order to keep Biovail out of the market. Although antitrust law may be available
to deter this kind of behavior,41 the situation illustrates that the ANDA 30-month stay provision combined
with the 180-day exclusivity provision can create situations which neither further the intellectual property
regime's role in providing innovation incentives nor further the Hatch Waxman's goal of expediting generic
drugs to the marketplace.
37See DC Cir. Rules FDA Regulation on Exclusivity is Invalid, 5 Andrews Intell. Prop. Litig. Rep. 5 (May 13, 1998).
38140 F.3d 1060, n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
39See id.
40See id.
41See FTC Settles Complaint, Charges Two More with Anticompetitive Conduct, 11 Andrews Antitrust Litig. Rep. 6 (May
1, 2000).
9The incentive of NDA holders to list as many patents in the Orange Book as possible (\land mine" patents)
exacerbates thirty-month stay provision problems. Regulations allow \drug substance (ingredient) patents,
drug product (formulation and composition) patents, and method of use patents" to be listed in the Orange
Book.42 Thus, pharmaceutical companies often list \unapproved uses, special crystalline forms of the active
ingredient, specic formulations, tablet shape or other subject matter."43 A patent on narrow subject matter
such as a special crystalline form or tablet shape would not cover an ANDA applicant's proposed use of the
same drug unless the applicant was using the exact same special form or shape.44 Nonetheless, if an ANDA
applicant certies against these narrow patents, the NDA holder may sue the ANDA applicant to trigger
the thirty-month stay provision.
In one article, Terry G. Mahn, a partner at Fish & Richardson, P.C., explicitly recommends that patent
prosecutors practice \evergreening" and \trip wire" listing of patents.45 Chemical intermediates of a NDA
drug and even things loosely associated with the drug, like a patent on adhesive for a transdermal patch,
can be listed in the Orange Book thus allowing the NDA holder to le suit and trigger the ANDA stay
provision.46 Mahn acknowledges that this kind of bootstrapping \may not be fair; however, it is allowed"
since the FDA has never sanctioned anyone for listing something in the Orange Book improperly and there
has never been a proceeding brought for an unauthorized ling.47
4221. C.F. R. x 314.53.
43Alfred Engelberg, Special patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have they Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 414
(1999).
44The Federal Circuit has stated, \It cannot be said { thought it often is, incorrectly, by the uninitiated, that a part of a claim
is `claimed' subject matter." See General Foods Corp. v. Strudiengesellsgraph Kohle mbh, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (1992). In
other words, if patent claim includes a certain active ingredient and a certain crystalline structure or tablet shape for utilizing
that active ingredient, it cannot be said that the patent claims the active ingredient. An ANDA applicant would be free to
manufacturer anything using the active ingredient as long as its use does not include every element of a claim of the NDA
holder's patent.
45Terry G. Mahn, The Hatch-Waxman Act During Patent Prosecution and Beyond, Food and Drug Law J. (1999).
46See id.
47Id.
10The Limited Options Available to ANDA Applicants
An ANDA applicant who wants to avoid the thirty-month stay provision and faces patents listed in the Orange
Book which do not cover the NDA drug itself but instead cover narrow forms of the drug or irrelevant uses
for the drug (unapproved uses) has a very limited number of undesirable legal options available to it. The
applicant either must argue to the FDA or to a court that paragraph IV certication should not be required
or must certify against all the patents listed in the Orange Book and hope to have the inevitable lawsuit by
the NDA holder dismissed on the merits as soon as possible to end the thirty-month stay.
The ANDA regulations require that certications be made only against patents \which claims the reference
[Orange Book] listed drug or that claims a use of such listed drug."48 To \claim" the drug, according to the
patent law denition of \claim," a patent's claim section would have to include every element directed at
the drug and no other elements. For example, a patent having claims that include elements of the drug and
elements of packaging does not \claim" the drug.49 The code suggests that the term \drug" includes only
drug products (dosage forms) and drug substances (active ingredients).50
In cases where a patent's claimed elements include more than dosage form or active ingredient (for example,
the patent may include packaging elements or crystalline form elements irrelevant to the active ingredient),
an ANDA applicant might be able to convince the FDA or a court that it does not need to certify against
patents even though they are listed in the Orange book because the patents \claim" more than the drug,
not the drug itself. Alternatively, the ANDA applicant may argue that the patents should be removed from
the Orange Book because the patent does not claim the drug, and that once removed, the patents need not
be certied against. Each of these approaches presents diculties.
FDA regulation interpretations indicate that, in the FDA's view, an ANDA applicant must certify against
every patent listed in the Orange Book. The FDA has \determined that `Congress intended that an ANDA
4821 C.F.R. x 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A).
49See General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbh, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (1992).
50See 21 C.F.R. x 314.53; 21C.F.R. x 314.3.
11applicant need only consult the Orange Book to determine the existence of an applicable patent claiming the
listed drug or use of the listed drug."'51 The FDA has explained that \[t]he Orange Book `provides notice to
potential ANDA applicants of the patents which may protect the pioneer drug product, thus allowing them
to provide appropriate certication under... the act."'52
The FDA's view is supported by the regulations' mechanism for challenging disputed patent.53 Existence of
a formal procedure for disputing an Orange Book listing implies that third parties would have a reason, such
as required certication, to dispute a listing. The FDA statements quoted by the Abbott court combined with
the formal procedure for ANDA applicants to challenge the relevancy of information listed in the Orange
Book indicates that the FDA is likely to interpret the code as requiring certication against all patents listed
under a drug in the Orange Book.
The FDA's stance on the issue is critical if an ANDA applicant hopes to receive approval without an extended
delay due to a court challenge of the FDA's position. A suit challenging the FDA's requirement that a
certain Orange Book patent be certied against could itself take thirty months to resolve, thus being useless
in preventing delay. Further, if an ANDA applicant argued in court that it need not certify against a patent
listed in the Orange Book, the FDA's stance carries substantial weight because \an agency's construction of
a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conict with the
expressed intent of Congress."54
Because the FDA is likely to rule that an ANDA applicant must provide certication against any patent
51Abbott Laboratories v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc., 934 F.Supp. 925, 934 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (quoting FDA decision regarding
Docket No. 94P-0144/CP1 and PSA1, January 6, 1995 at p. 7).
52Id. (quoting at p. 4).
5321 C.F.R. x 3114.94(12)(vii).
54United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
12listed in the Orange Book without evaluating whether or not the listed patent claims the drug or drug
product, an ANDA applicant may wish to remove a patent from the Orange Book before refusing to certify
against the patent. The Supreme Court in dicta stated that \ANDA's and paper NDA's are required to
contain one of the four certications with respect to each patent named in the pioneer drug application"
thus implying that no certication needs to be made against patents not included in the Orange Book.55
Further, the FDA's interpretation states that an ANDA applicant should only need to consult the Orange
Book in determining what certications are necessary.56
Unfortunately for ANDA applicants, it is rather dicult to have a patent removed from the Orange Book.
The regulations allow ANDA applicants to dispute \the accuracy or relevance of patent information."57
Under this regulation, a party disputing a patent listing must inform the FDA of its grounds of disagreement
with the patent's inclusion.58 The FDA then requests the NDA holder to withdraw or amend its patent
information.59 If the NDA holder refuses, the Orange Book remains unchanged and the ANDA applicant
must certify against every listed patent.60 Since the regulation puts NDA patent listing entirely at the
control of the NDA holder, the procedure provides no hope of relief for ANDA applicants who feel a patent
is listed improperly.
A district court may however issue a declaratory judgment that a NDA holder must remove a patent from
the Orange Book.61 In Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., the court gave the
55Eli Lilly and Company v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
56Abbott Laboratories v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc., 934 F.Supp. 925, 933 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that \an ANDA need
provide certication ...only for patents listed by an NDA applicant in its application and subsequently, by the FDA in the
Orange Book").
5721 C.F.R. x 314.53(f).
58See id.
59See id.
60See id.
61See Abbott Laboratories v. Novopharm Limited, 104 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that an order requiring patent
assignee to remove an expired patent from the Orange Book was proper); Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc. v. Novartis Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 10 F.Supp. 2d 446, 457 (D.N.J. 1998) (ultimately denying a preliminary injunction to remove a patent listing
from the Orange Book because the disputed patent claimed a drug substance that was an ingredient of the approved drug
product).
13FDA's listing of a patent some deference since the FDA has rejected patents in the past.62 However, the
Court held that an Orange Book listing creates no presumption that the patent is listed correctly because the
FDA lacks resources and expertise to properly review submitted patents.63 Therefore, an ANDA applicant
could perhaps avoid the thirty-month stay provision by challenging, in court, a patent's inclusion in the
Orange Book. However, lawsuits are often lengthy processes, and a lawsuit challenging an Orange Book
listing could delay ANDA approval almost as much, or perhaps even more, than the thirty-month stay
provision.
Strategies involving refusal to certify or removal of a patent from the Orange Book rely on the argument
that the patents do not claim the NDA approved drug or use. If the patents claim legitimate variants of
the drug or drug use, there is no way an ANDA applicant can argue that they need not certify against
these patents even if the patents claim variants which are not useful or are irrelevant to ANDA applicant's
proposed product.
If an ANDA applicant is unable to reasonably argue that it need not certify against a NDA holder's patent
or is unwilling to go through what may be a lengthy court battle to have a patent removed from the Orange
book, the only option is to certify against the NDA holder's patent, wait for the NDA holder's lawsuit to
trigger the thirty-month stay provision, and try to get the lawsuit dismissed as quickly as possible. The
problem with this situation is that the stay provision acts like a preliminary injunction entered against the
ANDA applicant regardless of the merits of the NDA holder's case or of the lack of irreparable harm the NDA
holder would suer.64 To avoid the injunction, the ANDA applicant must obtain dismissal by showing that
the NDA holder's suit could not be successful even if all facts are favorable to the NDA holder, where under
a normal preliminary injunction standard the NDA holder would have the burden of showing a likelihood of
6210 F.Supp. 2d 446, 457 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting Pzer, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration, 753 F.Supp. 171 (D.Md.
1990) (upholding the FDA's refusal to enter Pzer's composition patent into the Orange Book)).
63See id. at 456.
64The harm to the NDA holder if the ANDA product was approved yet infringed may be purely economic and therefore not
irreparable.
14the suit's success on the merits.
Incentives of Patent Law
Exclusive rights granted for the originator of an invention or creative work, intellectual property rights, are
well recognized in the modern laws of nearly every nation.65 In fact, the Constitution specically allows
Congress \to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."66 The primary question when
formulating intellectual property regimes is, \How much exclusivity should be granted and for what period
of time?"
A number of principle philosophical foundations for privileging intellectual property rights exist. The foun-
dations can help inform policy makers on what extent of intellectual property rights should be granted.
Specically, the ANDA thirty-month stay provision can be evaluated on the basis of how well the provision
furthers the goals addressed by these philosophical foundations.
Economic Analysis
The United States patent law regime, according to most courts, is primarily concerned with providing an
economic incentive for invention. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, \The patent monopoly was not
designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement,
to bring forth new knowledge."67 People are more likely to invent new products if they get an award in
the form of the exclusive right to sell the product because the exclusive right to sell often translates into
65Notably, Islamic law does not recognize intellectual property rights.
66U.S. Const., Art. I, cl. 8.
67Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9, 86 S.Ct. 684, 689 (1966).
15the ability to charge signicant royalties for the invention compared to the price that would be charged if
competition existed.
The ability of the patent law to encourage development of knowledge through incentives must be weighed
against the harm caused by the \patent monopoly."68 Ultimately, the inventor's royalty results in higher
prices for consumers of the invention and perhaps a reduced output of production of the invention.69 Higher
cost and lower output of the invention may mean that the public resorts to inecient alternatives or in
some cases goes without the utility the invention would provide, and thus, the public utility may not be
maximized.
Applying a utilitarian or economic standard to drug patents is an especially delicate balance. Obviously, for
utilitarian and humanitarian reasons, the development of promising new drugs should remain a very high
priority, and the government should maximize incentives for developing these new drugs. On the other hand,
the costs of one inventor maintaining a monopoly on a drug are also quite high. Patient demand for a very
needed drug is relatively inelastic, so the royalty on a drug monopoly can be very costly to consumers.
The ANDA thirty-month stay provision is problematic from an economic or utilitarian perspective for several
reasons. First, an NDA holder may sue an applicant based on any patent listed in the Orange Book for which
it can make even the most strained argument for infringement. Many of these patents cover \unapproved
uses, special crystalline forms of the active ingredient, specic formulations, tablet shape or other subject
matter"70 which may or may not be truly useful or practical in a real world setting.71 For drugs, ecacy
in a laboratory experiment is sucient to meet the utility requirement of patent law72 even though ecacy
68See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting).
69See id. Also, consider the very basic principle of supply and demand. If the price of the invented product is high, consumers
will buy less of the product (assuming some elasticity), and output of the invention is reduced compared to a situation with
high competition.
70Alfred Engelberg, Special patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have they Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 414
(1999).
71Utility is a requirement in order for a patent applicant to be issued a patent by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce, but
the only the barest showing of potential utility is required. Economic practicality is never required for a patent to meet the
utility requirement.
72See Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
16in a laboratory experiment certainly does not mean the drug would be useful in a wide variety of human
patients or could possibly be made commercially viable.
Thus, the thirty-month stay provision extends the patent monopoly on a drug sold by the NDA holder while
potentially only encouraging the NDA holder to prosecute and le suit on patents that disclose inventions
that really do not help society at all. In these cases, the stay provision clearly is not supported by an
economic or utility maximizing approach to patent law since the provision does nothing to encourage useful
drug development while society suers all the costs of the patent monopoly.
Secondly, the thirty-month stay provision encourages drug companies to le suit against an ANDA applicant
based on unsustainably broad interpretations of their patent claims. For example, Bayer was able to utilize
the thirty-month stay provision to prevent Elan from selling a drug with a measured SSA of 6.15 m2/g on
the basis of a Bayer patent listed in the Orange Book which only claimed a range of 1.0 to 4 m2/g.73 Bayer's
patent is the only legal instrument which documents what Bayer has invented and what knowledge Bayer
has contributed to the world in exchange for a patent monopoly, and according to this document, Bayer did
not invent any variant of the drug having a SSA greater than 4 m2/g. Bayer may have drafted and amended
its claims to avoid this greater range because another entity previously invented the drug in the higher SSA
range, because it did not believe the drug would be useful in the higher range, or possibly because it did not
know the drug was useful or possible to manufacture in the higher range.
Regardless, Bayer was able to exert a thirty-month monopoly over a product it never invented because of
the presumptive preliminary injunction eect of the thirty-month stay provision. The thirty-month stay
provision triggered the negative patent monopoly eect of intellectual property law without society being
able to reap any innovation. Additionally, Elan's product was kept from consumers even though it may have
been more innovative that Bayer's patent if it is the case that Bayer never considered a high SSA range.
73See Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
17The thirty-month stay provision could, in a situation like this, reduce the incentive for a company like Elan
to develop new drug products.
Third, the thirty-month stay provision does not particularly encourage patents on the core commercial
drug invention but instead encourages the practice of listing \evergreening" and \trip wire" patents.74 In
order to promote maximum utility and economic eciency in society, it would be far better to encourage
development on useful core drug inventions instead of encouraging drug companies to spend resources devising
and identifying non-useful sub-inventions that may act as \trip wire" patents.
A fourth problem with the thirty-month stay provision from an economic or utility maximizing perspective is
that it encourages drug company emphasis on prots through patents in general. One problem with patents
is that their power to encourage invention is limited by the ability of consumers to pay monopoly rents. The
patent system works very well in encouraging development of drugs that benet, no matter how slightly, the
part of the population that can aord monopoly rents (Viagra and Rogaine are examples). The patent law
does very little to encourage development of drugs that will help people who can not aord to pay for drugs
even where the benet for society as a whole is potentially very large (drugs to treat AIDs and malaria in
the impoverished African nations for example).
The most economically ecient system would encourage that drugs be developed that will help society the
most for the minimum research costs, rather than encouraging development of drugs that help the wealthy
segment of the population slightly at greater research expense. To reach greater eciency than the patent
system allows, the public could, for example, divert funds from monopoly rents paid to patent holders toward
direct government subsidies for drug researchers developing drugs which attack the most devastating diseases
that eect the greatest number of people.
74Terry G. Mahn, The Hatch-Waxman Act During Patent Prosecution and Beyond, Food and Drug Law J. (1999).
18The thirty-month stay provision enhances the value of patents in a vague way by allowing the patent to
be used to signicantly delay ANDA approval regardless of whether the patent actually covers the ANDA
drug as long as some argument for infringement can be made. By enhancing the value of patents, the stay
provision encourages drug companies to focus on the kind of drugs that are made most valuable by patents,
namely those drugs which are marketable to people have the money to pay monopoly rents. Since drugs
that provide slight utility to wealthy people are not necessarily the drugs that provide maximum utility to
the human population as a whole, the thirty-month stay provision, and patent law for new drugs generally,
is not necessarily an ecient means for providing incentives for drug invention.
A fth problem with the thirty-month stay provision is that any gains it may provide to a company are too
unpredictable and speculative to be substantial incentive for research and development. The drug company's
primary patent on a new drug protects the company's monopoly on the NDA product for at least twenty
years from the date the patent is led. \Evergreening" or \trip wire" patents which might trigger the thirty-
month stay of ANDA approval would not have value until after the primary patent which prevents others
from manufacturing and selling the drug has expired.
During the twenty-year life of the primary patent, a better drug or treatment technology could potentially
be developed thus making the potentiality of a thirty-month stay of competing ANDAs worthless. The
thirty-month stay provision could be rescinded or reinterpreted not to be triggered upon suits based on
\trip wire" patents again making the stay provision worthless. After twenty years, there may be no need to
exclude ANDA competitors as it could be that no signicant competitor exists.
Since, ex ante, a drug company or inventor is likely to consider the potential gains from the thirty-month
stay provision merely speculative rather than signicant, the stay provision provides very little incentive for
new drug manufacture. The stay provision is thus economically inecient since it not likely to provide the
public with the benet of new drugs even though the public pays the full price of the thirty-month patent
19monopoly whenever a company triggers the stay provision.
There more ecient possibilities for encouraging research and development of new drugs rather than allowing
new drug applicants to block ANDA applications based on patents which would not meet a preliminary
injunction standard. One possibility, mentioned above, is that the public's payments toward patent monopoly
rents could be shifted towards direct research for the most needed drugs. In this scenario, the thirty-month
stay provision would decrease in importance as drug patents in general decrease in importance to drug
companies.
Another possibility is an accelerated FDA review of new drug applications. Accelerated review of FDA new
drug applications could greatly increase prots by allowing the NDA holder's product to get to market more
quickly. Accelerated review is worth more to companies, and is thus a better incentive, than future delay
of competition in the marketplace through the thirty-month stay provision. The value from future delay of
competition may be several years away and thus any gains must be discounted against the time value of
money.75
Labor-Desert Theory
The labor-desert theory of intellectual property stems from Locke's second treatise of government. Locke
explained that natural goods are converted into private goods through human labor.76 Intellectual property
75See How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Aected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry (vis-
ited Mar. 6, 2001) <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655& sequence=0&from=5>. The study from the Congressional
Budget Oce explains in Section Four why an accelerated review process provides better economic incentives to research and
development of new drugs than extended patent terms.
76See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 297 (1988).
20can be included as \natural goods converted to private goods" if one assumes that ideas require labor, are
taken from a \common" which is not devalued by the idea's removal, and can be made property without
waste.77
The Lockean view of property applies quite well to modern drug patents because new drugs are usually
discovered through a expensive process involving time, capital commitment, human labor, and trial and
error rather than through an \eureka" epiphany. Drug researchers would most likely rather be on vacation
than in their laboratory thus tting the avoidance theory of labor.78 Also, new and useful drugs clearly add
value to the human experience, so their development would count as labor under a value-added theory.79
In the context of the thirty-month stay provision however, a great deal of intellectual property used to exclude
an ANDA product from the market cannot meet the standards necessary to justify it under a Lockean labor-
desert theory. \Trip wire" patents consisting of ancillary formulations which are not useful certainly could
not count as property under a value-added theory because these patents claim non-useful variants. Labor
avoidance theory does not support \trip wire" patents to the extent the patents are simply new descriptions
of previously invented drugs and required no additional research and development labor. Nonetheless, under
the current statutory regime, these patents exert the force of a property right by allowing the NDA holder
to exclude the ANDA applicant from the marketplace for a thirty-month period.
Similarly, the use of a NDA holder's overly broad reading of a patent to trigger the thirty-month stay
provision does not conform to Lockean notions. In this case, the NDA holder is taking from the common
an idea that the holder did not invent through the patent monopoly. In some cases, the NDA holder may
be preventing the true inventor or developer of an idea from reaping the deserved rewards of their labor by
enforcing the thirty-month stay provision via a patent covering a merely similar idea. Thus, use of overly
broad patents or \trip wire" patents to trigger the stay provision may actually be antagonistic to the Lockean
77See id. at 300.
78See id. at 302.
79See id. at 305.
21philosophical labor-desert ideal rather than enhancing it.
Personality Theory
Hagel suggested that personal property is important precisely because a holder of property \could not be
the particular person she is without it."80 Hagel called property \the rst embodiment of freedom and so
in itself a substantive end."81 Intellectual property can be said to reect and carry personality strongly in
poems, books, and music.82
Drug design does not typically reect personality to a high degree. Typically, drug designers are simply
trying to nd a chemical composition that works well. Little room is left for discretionary or creative
maneuvers.83 Thus, personality theory is not well suited to evaluating either the legitimacy of drug patents
or the thirty-month stay provision.
Social Planning Theory
The fourth justication for intellectual property, social planning theory, asks the question, \[W]hat are the
features of a just and attractive culture?"84 Fischer proposes that a just and attractive culture includes
a cornucopia of information and ideas, a rich artistic tradition, distributive justice, semiotic democracy,
sociability, and respect.85 To these principles, I suggest adding the concept of administrative eciency.86
80Margaret Jane Rubin, Property and Personhood, 34 STNLR 957, 972 (1982).
81See id. at 973 (quoting The Standard English translation of GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS is
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox trans. 1942) at 45.
82See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 341 (1988).
83C.f. id. at 342. Hughes suggests that a computer programmer who is faced with ten equally ecient and useful programming
choices exhibits personality and artistry in choosing among the choices. Although a bit of artistry may be involved when a drug
developer chooses which molecules to subject to a trial and error process, the ultimate choice of which drugs are viable reect
the utility of the molecule much more than the researchers personality.
84See William Fischer III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHIKLR 1203, 1215 (1998).
85See id. at 1216-1218.
86Administrative eciency could easily be considered under the economic analysis heading instead. As Fischer makes clear
22In terms of social planning, a society is best served when the eects of disease and disability are minimized
through a wide variety of useful drugs and maximum patient access to those drugs. A healthy society is
more able to participate in democracy and art.
Determining a regime for just drug distribution is obviously important to a social planning vision but is
also highly open to debate. For example, a proposition that maximizes overall human utility by alleviating
the most pain in the most people for the least cost might not be considered just if evaluated using certain
capitalism norms. Perhaps the notion of distributive justice is useful at least for reigning in the other norms.
For example, it is probably not just to provide life saving drugs only to artists who promote artistic tradition
or only to people who enhance democracy by choosing to vote in local elections.
By identifying the norms key to evaluating the thirty-month stay provision using social planning theory, we
are left with the question: does the thirty-month stay provision enhance human health by promoting new
drugs and access to those drugs without violating the norms of distributive justice (whatever those may be)?
The answer is a clear no.
The thirty-month stay provision likely does very little to encourage drug companies to invent new drugs
because the gain from the stay provision are speculative and far in the future.87 Second, the provision may
even stie new drug development to the extent that drug companies are more concerned with coming up
with \trip wire" patents and extending the economic value of current drug products rather than developing
new products and to the extent that innovative ANDA applicants are excluded from the marketplace.
The stay provision prevents competition from entering the marketplace thus denying access to drugs for those
in his article, the boundaries separating the four theories of intellectual property are \far from precise." See id. at 1215.
87See the economic analysis infra.
23who cannot aord monopoly rates. A capitalist norm of distributive justice is violated to the extent that the
competition is stied based on something other than a legitimate property right. A more redistributive or
welfare maximizing norm is also violated in that the poor people, who perhaps suer more than the wealthy
when they are sick,88 cannot get access to medicine.
Most importantly, the thirty-month stay provision is very administratively inecient. NDA holders can
almost guarantee the availability of the thirty-month stay provision if they go through the steps of prosecuting
\trip wire" patents, bring suit against ANDA applicants within fteen days of paragraph IV certication, and
propose legitimate enough arguments (albeit perhaps quite strained) during the course of litigation to ensure
that the litigation is not resolved quickly.89 The NDA holder invokes a wide range bureaucracies including
the Patent and Trademark Oce, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Federal court system in order
to obtain the extended thirty-months of protection. Even if one nds that the thirty-month stay provision
has merit and serves a legitimate substantive purpose, the stay could perhaps be made automatic to avoid
the time, expense, and frustration that may result from invoking so much governmental machinery.
Legal Professionalism
If suits are being brought merely to trigger the thirty-month stay provision rather than on the merits of the
case, the question arises: may lawyers ethically participate in this kind of litigation? The American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:
88A wealthy person is better equipped to survive if they lose their job or societal connections due to illness because they have
saved capital. Second, a wealthy person can aord luxuries which may distract themselves from the sickness or otherwise make
the sickness more tolerable.
89Even if the case is decided on motion for summary judgment, it could easily be thirty months from the time the suit
is initiated to the time summary judgment motions are decided. See, e.g., Marrion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 1050 (S.D.Fla. 1996).
24A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument
for an extension, modication or reversal of existing law.90
The annotations to the code go on to state that an advocate has a duty not to abuse legal procedure, but
that the law is \not always clear and is never static."91
The \not frivolous" standard of conduct is rather vague. A suit brought in order to trigger the thirty-
month stay provision clearly serves the client's substantive purpose of delaying a competitor's entry into
the marketplace. The suit however may be considered frivolous \if it is found, beyond doubt and under
any arguable legal or factual construction, that the substance of the claim would not entitle the claimant to
relief."92
Since the facts of the patent cases triggering the thirty-month stay provision are often not in dispute, the
question of frivolousness depends on the likelihood of relief under any arguable legal construction. While an
experienced patent attorney may know full well that a case has zero chance on the merits,93 a trial judge
unfamiliar with patent law may not recognize that no arguable construction could make the NDA holder's
case winnable. Thus, it seems unlikely that a lawyer would be sanctioned for ling a lawsuit to trigger the
thirty-month stay provision as long as some tortured legal argument can be made.
The individual's personal sense of professional responsibility might however preclude him or her from ling
suits that they feel are meritless. How an individual attorney proceeds is likely to depend on their view
of their role as a professional. Are lawyers obligated to pursue the client's interests in every permissible
manner? Or do lawyers have a greater obligation to present the court only with meritorious arguments that
91See id. at comment 1.
92See id. at legal background.
93For example, it seems unlikely that any patent attorney would not realize that a patent would expire twenty years from
the date of its earliest parent application even in light of the GATT changes. See Abbott Laboratories v. Novopharm Ltd., 38
U.S.P.Q.2d 1309 (N.D.Ill. 1996).
25will advance justice and the state of the law?
Antitrust Limitations
Because a lawsuit brought in order to trigger the thirty-month stay provision is brought in order to maintain a
monopoly, antitrust law is implicated. The FTC has led complaints against NDA holders who conspire with
an ANDA applicant to prevent generic products from reaching the marketplace.94 In reaching a settlement
with Abbott Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals Inc., the FTC required the companies to stipulate
that they will not enter contracts where an ANDA applicant agrees with a NDA holder not to waive or transfer
exclusivity rights or produce a generic product.95 The settlement also requires any agreement during pending
patent litigation involving payment of ANDA applicants by NDA holders to prevent production of generic
drugs be approved by the court.96
The FTC's enforcement actions are attacking situations similar to those that arose in In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litigation.97 In this case, the court held that drug companies could be liable for violation of the
Sherman Act because of agreements where a NDA holder pays an ANDA applicant not to market a generic
product, even if the agreement is incidental to a patent suit.98
Even if agreements between NDA holders and ANDA applicants are likely to give rise to signicant antitrust
issues as in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, it is far less likely that the single act of an individual
NDA holder suing a ANDA applicant implicates antitrust law. Noerr-Pennington doctrine generally gives
antitrust immunity parties who engage in legitimate government petitioning activity even if some injury to
94See FTC Settles Complaint, Charges Two More with Anticompetitive Conduct, 11 Andrews Antitrust Litig. Rep. 6 (May
1, 2000).
95See id.
96See id.
97105 F.Supp. 2d 618 (E.D. Mich 2000).
98See id. at 642.
26competition results directly or indirectly.99 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has extended antitrust immunity
to \non-sham, pre-litigation threats of suit, demand letters, and communications about pending suits."100
This extension combined with an immunity extended to an antitrust defendant's refusal to settle101 makes
clear that invoking litigation itself is immune from antitrust liability even if there are anticompetitive results.
Noerr acknowledged however that petitions to the government are not immune when they are merely a
\sham."102 To determine if litigation is a sham, it must be \objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.103 Secondly, in a sham litigation, \the
baseless suit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor."104
The rst prong in proving antitrust violation through sham litigation may be dicult, for many excluded
generic drug manufacturers to prove when formulating an antitrust claim. Specic facts supporting an
objectively baseless claim must be alleged.105 In In re Cardizem, the State Law Plaintis alleged sucient
facts to state a claim by asserting that the generic manufacturer provided samples of the product to the
NDA holder, Hoechst, for them to evaluate and conrm no infringement and that Hoechst prosecuted and
listed in the Orange Book a second patent which has no signicant change or improvement to the original
product but instead was prosecuted and listed for the purposes of initiating litigation and triggering the
thirty-month stay provision.106 In other words, the \trip wire" patents recommended by Terry Mahn107
99See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1961).
100In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F.Supp. 2d 618, 637 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (citing McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco,
Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1558-60 (11th Cir.1992)(pre- litigation threats of suit); Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694
F.2d 1358, 1366-67 (5th Cir.1983) (same); and Barq's, Inc. v. Barq's Beverages, Inc., 677 F.Supp. 449, 453 (E.D.La.1987)
(observing that threatened litigation and attending publicity was considered part and parcel of the petitioning immunity of
Noerr-Pennington if the litigation itself was in good faith and thus holding that the plainti's pre-litigation demand letters
were also protected under the Noerr-Pennington petitioning immunity)).
101See id. at 638 (citing Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real *639 Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525,
1528-29 (9th Cir.1991), a'd sub nom, Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 113
S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993); PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 350, 358-59
(S.D.N.Y.1998); Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Pacic Gas & Elec. Co., 61 F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D.Cal.1999).
102See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
103Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
104Id.
105See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F.Supp. 2d 618, 644 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
106See id. at n. 11.
107Terry G. Mahn, The Hatch-Waxman Act During Patent Prosecution and Beyond, Food and Drug Law J. (1999).
27could give rise to antitrust liability if they are sought for the sole purpose of triggering the thirty-month
ANDA stay provision.
Recommendations and Conclusion
The statutory thirty-month stay of approval triggered by paragraph IV certication and subsequent patent
infringement suit by the NDA holder is not ecient when evaluated under any of the prevalent norms jus-
tifying intellectual property regimes. The thirty-month stay provision allows NDA applicants to prevent
generic drugs from entering the marketplace on the basis of expired patents, unsustainably broad readings of
core patents on the NDA product, and \trip wire" or \evergreening" patents which do not reect substantial
change or improvement over an original patent but are prosecuted for the sole purpose of triggering the stay
provision.
The problems created by Hatch-Waxman Act's creation of the thirty-month stay provision should be ad-
dressed at many levels. First and most obviously, Congress should repeal the certication requirement for
ANDA applicants. NDA holders would still be able to protect their innovations through standard patent law
enforcement just like any other inventors. NDA holders would simply no longer benet from special treat-
ment. Even if Congress does not act, other entities can minimize the problems created by the thirty-month
stay provision.
The FDA should interpret Hatch-Waxman Act within statutory constraints in order to minimize the stay
provision's eect. The FDA could reasonably interpret the Hatch-Waxman Act to only allow core patents
directly covering the NDA product to be listed in the Orange Book,108 and rigorously review all patents
submitted for inclusion in the Orange Book for suitability. Additionally, the FDA could evaluate the expira-
108See Pzer, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration, 753 F.Supp. 171 (D.Md. 1990) (upholding the FDA's refusal to enter
Pzer's composition patent into the Orange Book).
28tion of dates submitted to the Orange Book rather than simply taking applicants at their word. These two
steps would eliminate the problem the stay provision being triggered by \trip
wire" patents and by expired patents.
Third, courts should more freely exercise their discretion under the Hatch-Waxman Act to modify the length
of the stay based on the plainti or defendant's failure \to cooperate reasonably in expediting the action."109
Courts could potentially, under this provision, reduce the length of the thirty-month stay to zero where the
plainti's action has such an extremely small chance on the merits that the NDA's ling of the suit or the
NDA holder's failure to settle the action for a nominal amount constitutes failure to expedite the action.
By utilizing available discretion in this manner, the courts can reduce the problems caused by thirty-month
stay provision while discouraging frivolous and nearly frivolous actions in their court. A court utilizing this
discretion brings might analyze the thirty-month stay provision using standards similar to those historically
accepted for preliminary injunctions.
Fourth, the FTC and parties excluded from the generic drug market because of the thirty-month stay
provision may seek remedies through antitrust laws in some cases. Although the burden of proving that a
claim is objectively baseless may not be easy to overcome and the process of litigating an antitrust trial may
take well over thirty months, the possibility of treble damages calculated on the basis of the generic drug
manufacturer's lost prots during the thirty months could bring enough pressure on NDA holders that at
least the most frivolous patent cases would be settled.
Finally, individual attorneys should refuse to pursue patent prosecution or litigation that has little merit
even if the client desires to trigger the thirty-month stay provision. An attorney's interest in maintaining a
10921 C.F.R. x 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A).
29professional reputation by advancing only positions with potential merit before the Patent and Trademark
Oce and before the Federal Courts along with the attorney's individual sense of morality and justice should
serve, to some extent, to prevent the attorney from engaging in litigation and patent prosecution that is
merely tactical. To best serve society, attorneys should aspire to substantively promoting justice and the
state of the law of the law through client advocacy rather than invoking meritless suits merely because the
suit serves a client's immediate interest such as triggering the thirty-month stay provision.
30